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1) Article summary 
 
Neuroenhancement is generally defined as the improvement of mental capacities. Such an 
improvement can be effected via traditional (e.g. education) or biomedical means. The use of 
the latter, in particular, is fiercely debated in various contexts. This entry focuses on 
neuroenhancement by means of biomedical technology, and on its use by competent adults in 
a non-military context, for non-therapeutic purposes. 
 
There are two main categories of neuroenhancement: cognitive and affective. Cognitive 
enhancement includes the use of psychoactive drugs like methylphenidate and modafinil to 
enhance wakefulness and concentration. Other capacities targeted for neuroenhancement 
include memory and learning, although there is still controversy about the impact of such 
substances on real-life (e.g. academic) performance. More recent and sophisticated 
neuroenhancement interventions include interventions such as electrical brain stimulation, 
and more speculative ones like brain implants. Affective enhancement comprises the 
modification of personality in socially rewarded ways, the improvement of mood, the 
removal or blunting unpleasant memories, the enhancement of motivation, and the 
modulation of romantic bonds between people.  
 
Prevalence estimates of neuroenhancement are highly variable according to technology, 
population, and environment, but provide a springboard for thinking about why individuals 
choose to engage in neuroenhancement. First, there is limited evidence to support safety and 
efficacy of existing neuroenhancement technologies. Chronic use of psychostimulants, for 
instance, can present health risks and lead to tolerance. Studies show that even if 
neuroenhancement technologies were efficacious, there can be limitations to their effects 
(due for instance to cognitive trade-offs). Second, neuroenhancement raises pressing ethical 
issues. The issue of fairness looms large in the ethical debate raising the question of what 
forms of improvement constitute “cheating”, as well as highlighting the need to ensure 
equitable access to any competitive advantages that neuroenhancement might confer. Several 
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different concerns about neuroenhancement fall under the umbrella of “authenticity”, which 
pertain to now neuroenhancement affects one’s identity, sense of self, true nature, and sense 
of achievement. Finally, there is disagreement as to whether the availability of 





2) Defining neuroenhancement 
 
In a general sense, neuroenhancement designates a set of methods that can improve people’s 
mental capacities. The phrase is also used to refer to the process of improvement itself, or to 
its outcome. There are, however, two dimensions along which philosophical definitions of 
neuroenhancement can be broader or narrower in nature. The first such dimension relates to 
the type of improvement method being considered. On a broad understanding, 
neuroenhancement includes non-biomedical means like education, mental training (e.g. 
mnemonic techniques or meditation), caffeine, and even physical exercise, as well as 
biomedical interventions. On a narrower conception, one that makes neuroenhancement 
ethically more controversial, the phrase exclusively covers biomedical forms of improvement 
(see “Technology and Ethics”, by Carl Mitcham and Helen Nissenbaum, in the REP), from 
drugs to brain stimulation, as laid out in more detail in the next section. 
 
The second dimension underlying broader and narrower definitions of neuroenhancement has 
to do with the initial state of the mental capacities being targeted, which could either involve 
a mental pathology, or a healthy state. The so-called treatment-enhancement distinction is 
relevant here (Erler, 2017). Leaving aside the tricky question of whether we can reliably and 
meaningfully distinguish between “normal” and “pathological” states, a broad definition of 
neuroenhancement encompasses both therapeutic and non-therapeutic forms of improvement 
(e.g. Dresler et al., 2019). A narrower definition reserves the ‘neuroenhancement’ label for 
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interventions of the latter type, even though the tools they involve can in principle be used for 
therapeutic purposes. This entry will explore the myriad ethical controversies specific to the 
narrow definitions of neuroenhancement.  
 
The narrow definition of neuroenhancement has inspired diverse nomenclature in the 
academic literature and public sphere. Some terms refer to the therapeutic foundations of 
neuroenhancement by discussing “non-medical” uses of substances and devices or even 
“cosmetic neurology” (Chatterjee, 2006).  Others reflect a lifestyle choice related to general 
wellbeing such as “better living through chemistry”. Our use of the word 
“neuroenhancement” focuses on functional outcomes in an attempt to avoid the kind of built-
in ethical judgments that other definitions arguably introduce, such as the “welfarist” 
definition of enhancement as including any intervention that increases a person’s chance of 
living a good life in a given set of circumstances (Savulescu et al., 2011). 
 
One might question whether neuroenhancement must necessarily involve an improvement in 
mental capacities, suggesting instead that diminutions in such capacities can sometimes also 
deserve the label. Possible examples include technologically erasing painful, although non-
pathological memories to enhance mood, or reducing the propensity to aggression in 
someone with a criminal history, but no diagnosed mental disorder, to enhance moral 
disposition. While such cases might indeed reasonably be construed as neuroenhancement, 
we may note that the ultimate goal and outcome of the relevant diminution is still to improve 
some other aspect of mental functioning.  
 
This entry focuses on the (non-therapeutic) use of neuroenhancement interventions by 
competent adults. In order to focus the scope of our discussion, we mostly leave aside issues 
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such as the application of neuroenhancement to children and the prenatal use of genetic 
interventions to maximize the mental abilities of future individuals (see “Genetic 
modification”, by Ainsley Newson and Antony Wrigley, and “Genetics and Ethics”, by Ruth 
Chadwick, in the REP).  Furthermore, while acknowledging the importance and extensive 
history of military uses of enhancement technologies, we limit our overview of the ethics to 
the civilian context. A thorough discussion of the ethics of military neuroenhancement would 
require a separate entry. 
 
3) The different types of neuroenhancement 
 
A variety of mental capacities are candidate targets for neuroenhancement. This section 
provides a brief overview of the capacities in question, and of the interventions, both existing 
and prospective, that might be used to improve them. For classificatory purposes, we can 
broadly distinguish two main categories of interventions: those targeted at “cognitive 
enhancement”, and those aimed at “affective enhancement”. 
 
a) Cognitive enhancement 
 
The most familiar example of cognitive neuroenhancement is probably the use of 
psychoactive drugs (dubbed “smart drugs” in the media) by healthy students with the goal of 
improving academic performance. Such drugs, originally designed to treat pathological 
conditions like ADHD, include stimulants like amphetamine and methylphenidate, and more 
recently, the wakefulness-promoting agent modafinil (Dubljevic, 2016; Brühl et al., 2019). 
Besides the student context, such drugs also have an established history of use in the armed 
forces  among military pilots (Mehlman, 2015). These substances are typically used to 
enhance wakefulness and concentration when working for extended periods (as in the case of 
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an all-night study session, or a prolonged air combat mission) – although, as we will see later 
on, the drugs might  be achieving their putative enhancement effects by impacting affective, 
rather than just cognitive, factors. 
 
Besides seeking means of focusing better and for longer on cognitively demanding tasks, a 
number of people turn to pharmacology with the aim of boosting their memory and their 
ability to learn. Some evidence has been found of positive effects of the above-cited drugs, as 
well the acetylcholinesterase inhibitor donepezil (Aricept), on certain aspects of memory and 
learning (Bagot and Kaminer, 2014; De Jongh, 2017). Whether such effects do in turn tend to 
improve academic performance among student users is questioned (Arria et al., 2017). 
 
Beyond psychoactive drugs, a more recent trend has been the growing interest in the 
cognitive enhancement potential of various forms of brain stimulation. These include, in 
particular, non-invasive forms such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). TMS involves the placing of an 
electromagnetic coil over the brain region to be stimulated, delivering short, high-power 
electrical surges. It requires relatively expensive and cumbersome equipment, making it 
fundamentally an in-clinic intervention. tDCS, by contrast, applies a low current to the brain 
via electrodes. tDCS devices are more portable and affordable than TMS equipment, making 
the technology more readily available for enhancement use outside the clinical context, as 
illustrated by the emergence of a “do-it-yourself” tDCS community (Wexler, 2016) and of 
commercial tDCS devices for home use. 
 
In addition to its potential for the treatment of conditions such Alzheimer’s disease and 
anxiety disorders, TMS has been reported to improve performance on attention, memory, and 
 6 
language tasks among healthy subjects (Luber and Lisanby, 2014). Similarly, tDCS is 
regarded as holding promise as a therapeutic option for patients with major depressive 
disorder, but may also be able to enhance attention, learning and memory in the non-impaired 
(Coffman et al., 2014), as well as vigilance in conditions of sleep deprivation (McIntire et al., 
2014). A study conducted by U.S. military scientists reported that tDCS could help enhance 
multitasking skills (Nelson et al., 2016). 
 
Finally, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) represent a more futuristic and radical avenue 
towards the enhancement of memory and other aspects of cognitive functioning (Dresler et 
al., 2019). Such devices can be more or less invasive, some requiring implantation under the 
scalp (“neural implants”), which carries greater risk but also tends to provide the most 
accurate reading of brain signals, while others use different methods, such as non-invasive 
neuroimaging. Most human applications of BCIs so far have been therapeutic in nature (e.g. 
allowing tetraplegic patients to control robotic limbs directly with their thoughts), yet some 
entrepreneurs working on the technology have explicitly stated their intention of ultimately 
achieving neuroenhancement applications (Jee, 2019). Recent research on memory implants 
has already suggested some enhancement potential in humans (Hampson et al., 2018). 
 
b) Affective enhancement 
 
Affective enhancement is arguably as old as the discovery of mood-altering substances, 
including hallucinogenic plants and alcohol, thousands of years ago. Discussions of the 
prospect of manipulating “normal” human feelings using biomedical means have a briefer, 
yet still long history: think for instance of the drug soma in Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave 
New World (Huxley, 1932). Public interest in such discussions was stimulated in the 1990s 
via psychiatrist Peter Kramer’s book Listening to Prozac (Kramer, 1993). In it, Kramer 
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describes patients whom he treated with the antidepressant fluoxetine (Prozac) for various 
mental ailments including depression, and who, according to him, were not merely cured but 
transformed, becoming “better than well”. Some reportedly developed a consistently high 
mood and a much more assertive (and socially rewarded) personality. Kramer’s stories 
remain anecdotal, and it is unclear at this point that one could reliably generate the type of 
personality makeover he describes using any psychoactive drug. Nonetheless, meta-analyses 
of the effects of “SSRI” antidepressants like fluoxetine on healthy subjects do suggest a 
decrease in negative affect (Serretti et al., 2010). 
 
One might seek to improve mood directly by taking antidepressants (or more traditionally, by 
consuming alcohol, or exercising). Indirect methods are also possible by erasing painful 
memories, or retaining their informational content but blunting their emotional impact – a 
process termed “memory editing” (Erler, 2011). Alleviating the symptoms of conditions like 
posttraumatic stress disorder is possible with some psychological interventions in a 
therapeutic context. Studies are now investigating whether better results can be achieved 
using biomedical means. One major example is the use of the beta-blocker propranolol, 
which can blunt a traumatic memory by disrupting either the original consolidation process 
(if used before or shortly after the event that caused it) or its “reconsolidation”, if used when 
the memory is brought back to mind at a later time (Beckers and Kindt, 2017). Other 
interventions being considered include optogenetics, a technique that uses lasers to alter 
memories by directly targeting certain neurons previously made sensitive to light (Glannon, 




Besides lifting mood and changing personality in desired ways, affective neuroenhancement 
might also target motivation, and emotional and behavioural dispositions. Some users of 
“smart drugs” thus report that the productivity benefits they claim to derive from them are at 
least partly related to the drugs’ positive impact on their motivation and energy levels (Ilieva 
and Farah, 2013). Besides the quest for greater productivity, however, the manipulation of 
motivation might also be tied to a different goal, that of moral neuroenhancement, which 
describes the improvement of a person’s moral capacities, motives, and behaviour. Some 
have suggested that drugs like modafinil and methylphenidate could, if coupled with good 
moral education, help enhance moral reasoning and overcome weakness of the will (Earp et 
al., 2017). They also propose the potential of the hormone oxytocin to help increase pro-
social emotions like empathy. SSRIs or brain stimulation have been discussed as candidates 
for reducing anti-social dispositions like aggression  (Focquaert and Schermer, 2015). 
 
One last subset of affective neuroenhancement concerns the prospect of using biomedical 
means to strengthen romantic bonds between two people over time, or on the contrary, to 
prevent the formation of such bonds when it is judged undesirable. Discussions of this issue, 
like the debate on moral neuroenhancement, mostly focus on the desirability of developing 
future interventions for such purposes, rather than on existing practices (as in the case of the 
controversy around smart drugs). Proponents of “love drugs” cite substances like oxytocin 
and MDMA as potential means of reinforcing pair bonding (Savulescu and Sandberg, 2008). 
By contrast, they mention SSRIs, androgen blockers, and the lowering of oxytocin levels as 
candidates forms of “anti-love biotechnology” (Earp et al., 2013). 
 
4) Estimated prevalence of neuroenhancement technology use 
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The exact prevalence of neuroenhancement practices in the general population is an elusive 
figure. Referring to Dresler et al.’s (2019) model of cognitive enhancement interventions, 
neuroenhancement broadly understood appears ubiquitous given behavioural interventions 
such as sleep, exercise, and nutrition used to enhance focus and concentration. However, in 
line with the focus of this entry, formal studies on the prevalence of neuroenhancement 
predominantly address the use of novel and repurposed technology that is accessible to the 
public such as stimulants and wearable brain stimulation. BCIs are less the subject of 
curiosity with respect to prevalence because they require medical oversight to implant and 
monitor. 
 
Prevalence estimates of neuroenhancement are highly variable according to technology, 
population, geography, and cultural context. Varying study methodology, data analysis, 
definitions of neuroenhancement and measures of lifetime or past-year use can reduce the 
comparative value of data. It is thus impossible to provide a globally relevant statistic. Most 
of the existing prevalence data focuses on the use of stimulants by university students 
because the higher education setting is considered a risk factor for increased diversion and 
use of prescription stimulants for neuroenhancement (Ford and Pomykacz, 2016). The 
abundance of research on the prevalence of neuroenhancement hailing from North America 
has established this region as a benchmark for comparison, further fuelled by media coverage 
describing neuroenhancement as an American ‘trend’ (Forlini and Racine, 2009). A review of 
North American studies on the non-medical use of stimulants in students reported a 
prevalence range of 2.5%- 55% (Smith and Farah, 2011). International data on the use of 
prescription and illegal stimulants for neuroenhancement has proven equally diverse with 
rates of 2.2% in Germany (Forlini et al., 2015), 11% in Austria (Dietz et al., 2018), 16% in 
Italy (Castaldi et al., 2012), 17 % in Switzerland (Maier et al., 2013), 7.8% in the Netherlands 
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(Schelle et al., 2015), 10% in the United Kingdom and Ireland (Singh et al., 2014), 11% in 
South Africa (Jain et al., 2017), and 6.5% in Australia (Lucke et al., 2018). A few studies 
have approached the subject of neuroenhancement in professional practice. Franke et al. 
(2013) reported that 8.9% of their sample of German surgeons had used a prescription or 
illegal stimulant in their lifetime for neuroenhancement. Dietz et al. (2016) reported that 19% 
of a sample of professionals working in the field of economics had done the same. Whether 
available neuroenhancement prevalence data are indicative of an underlying issue is a matter 
of contention that has evoked discussions of self-medication (Lucke et al., 2013), 
professional responsibility of medical professionals with respect to prescribing substances 
(Forlini et al., 2013), and institutional policies on neuroenhancement (Aikins et al., 2017).  
 
There have been a few attempts to study neuroenhancement in the general population. In 
2008, the science journal Nature published the results of a public poll stating that 20% of the 
1400 respondents from 60 countries had used a prescription pharmaceutical for enhancement 
purposes (Maher, 2008). Partridge et al. (2012) found a 2.4% prevalence of stimulant use for 
neuroenhancement in an Australian community sample in 2012. Two small studies have 
brought to light the active community of at-home tDCS users in the general public. Wexler’s 
study showed that the typical tDCS user was “a wealthy, highly educated, liberal, 
fortysomething male living in the USA who reported being an early adopter of technology” 
with three quarters of respondents using the technology for neuroenhancement (Wexler, 
2018, p. 131).  Jwa (2015) confirmed that tDCS was being used at home mostly for 
neuroenhancement but also self-treatment of several types of neurological conditions. Most 
recently, Maier et al. (2018) published a cross-sectional study of results from the Global Drug 
Survey (GDS), an anonymous web survey on substance use conducted annually in 15 
countries with participants aged 16-65. The study found a 180% increase in the use of 
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prescription and illegal stimulants for neuroenhancement between the GDS in 2015 (4.9%) 
and the GDS in 2017 (13.7%). Evidence of increased prevalence in all countries participating 
in the GDS challenges critiques of prevalence data that is used to sustain the ‘myth’ that 
neuroenhancement is widespread and increasing (Schleim and Quednow, 2018; Zohny, 
2015). 
 
5) Ethical issues pertaining to neuroenhancement 
 
a) Limited evidence to support the safety and efficacy of neuroenhancement 
technologies 
 
Given that some putative neuroenhancement technologies have medical indications (as 
discussed above) or research uses (e.g. tDCS for stroke rehabilitation), safety and efficacy in 
healthy individuals is often (erroneously) assumed by those seeking neuroenhancement 
(Forlini and Racine, 2012b). Excessive or chronic use of psychostimulants in the absence of a 
medical need carries known risks including addiction, psychosis, and even sudden death in 
some cases (Lakhan and Kirchgessner, 2012). Chronic neuroenhancement use may itself lead 
to excessive use if it fosters tolerance to the drug in question. While modafinil and tDCS 
seem to display a favourable safety profile even when used for neuroenhancement purposes, 
the long-term effects of such use are still not fully known (Brühl et al., 2019). Furthermore, 
the use of tDCS by hobbyists outside the clinical context may present additional risks, related 
for instance to incorrect placement of the electrodes (Jwa, 2015). 
 
From a scientific perspective, there is no consensus on whether repurposed or investigational 
technologies produce significant and consistent neuroenhancement effects in healthy 
individuals (Dresler et al., 2019). There is weak evidence demonstrating neuroenhancement 
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effects of substances such as methylphenidate (Repantis et al., 2010b), antidepressants 
(Repantis et al., 2009) and donepezil (Repantis et al., 2010a). Systematic reviews report 
moderate efficacy of modafinil for neuroenhancement, which is emerging as a popular option 
because most experience few or no side effects (Battleday and Brem, 2015). Outside the 
laboratory, students using prescription medication for neuroenhancement did not experience 
improvement in their grades over four years of study (Arria et al., 2017). In fact, students 
showing the greatest improvement were those that abstained from using prescription 
medications. Given the inconsistent evidence base on the efficacy of purported 
neuroenhancement substances, it is unclear whether individuals can make truly informed 
decisions. Indeed, individuals may be encouraged to use these substances by secondary 
sources such as the media or social media networks (Forlini et al., 2015). These sources are 
known for relating anecdotal evidence about neuroenhancement effects without equal 
discussion of the risks or medical oversight that would typically be available to individuals 
with a prescription for medications associated with neuroenhancement.  
 
Though they appear promising, data on the neuroenhancement effects of non-invasive brain 
stimulation devices is inconsistent due to lack of comparable and successfully replicated 
studies (Reteig et al., 2017). Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent commercially available 
brain stimulation devices are based on validated laboratory research (Wexler and Reiner, 
2019). In this regard, neuroenhancement raises ethical concerns because individuals without 
any impairment could be incurring undue risk using substances and devices outside of 
sanctioned indications in the absence of oversight, medical or otherwise. These concerns 
have led to calls for a public health framework for neuroenhancement that recognizes the 
positive effects of healthy behaviours such as proper sleep, exercise and nutrition in order to 
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discourage the use of unproven and potentially deceptive technologies (Lucke and Partridge, 
2013).  
 
Studies show that even if neuroenhancement technologies were efficacious, there might be 
limitations to their effects. First, the amount of enhancement experienced could be dependent 
on dose and subject. Reviews of the effects of prescription stimulants indicate an inverted U-
shaped dose-response model where low doses improve cognitive performance but high doses 
impair performance (de Jongh et al., 2008). Similarly, the neuroenhancement effects of 
prescription stimulants, brain stimulation, and cognitive training appear to be dependent on an 
individual’s baseline performance (Dresler et al., 2019). The higher the baseline performance, the 
smaller the enhancement effect. These findings are interpreted as an “enhancement ceiling” 
indicating that perhaps human cognition has a definitive performance upper limit (Farah et al., 
2009). Second, cognitive “trade-offs” have been observed in neuroenhancement uses of 
pharmaceuticals and brain stimulation. These occur when one cognitive capacity is enhanced at 
the detriment of another suggesting that cognition has a maximum capacity often likened to a 
zero-sum game (de Jongh et al., 2008; Brem et al., 2014).  None of these limitations seems to 
have hampered the enthusiasm for neuroenhancement, which some argue may be fuelled by 
anecdotal evidence or a placebo effect (Smith and Farah, 2011).  
 
The uncertainty in scientific evidence on the safety and efficacy of neuroenhancement for healthy 
individuals is difficult to reconcile with its prevalence. Even the lowest prevalence rates indicate 
a group of individuals prepared to incur disappointment or risk to their health in pursuit of 
enhanced cognition. The contexts that motivate the pursuit of enhanced cognition are discussed in 
the remainder of this section. These contexts reinforce the need for ethical deliberation to guide 
acceptability of these practices (Forlini and Racine, 2013). Insofar as the enhancement effect of 
some existing interventions is still an open question, and as the advent of more clear-cut instances 
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of neuroenhancement remains a future possibility (actively pursued by some), discussions that 
assume the efficacy of such interventions need not be reduced to idle speculation. Nonetheless, 
contributors to such discussions should be careful to make their empirical assumptions explicit, 
and to indicate the extent to which they are supported by the available evidence (Racine et al., 
2014). 
 
b) Fairness as a multi-faceted concept in neuroenhancement 
 
The zero-sum model has guided debates about the fairness of neuroenhancement. The 
assumption is that one individual’s cognitive gain is another’s loss. It has inspired polarized 
positions about whether neuroenhancement constitutes cheating in competitive environments 
(Schermer, 2008). While that question remains unresolved, there are indications that an 
answer hinges on the authenticity of a performance, i.e. whether neuroenhancement provides 
a replacement or shortcut in the effort required to achieve a performance or goal (Forlini and 
Racine, 2012a). This view invites analogies of neuroenhancement with sports competitions 
that have strict rules against certain types of performance enhancement (Savulescu, 2006). 
What rules would neuroenhancement break? Someone who won the World Memory 
Championships by using a futuristic BCI that allowed storage and retrieval of information 
with the ease of a computer would obviously be in breach of Championship rules, but it is 
unclear what rules would be broken by neuroenhancement in other competitive academic or 
professional environments. Neuroenhancement technologies may have an effect on the 
concentration, alertness and memory of healthy individuals but they are not the type of 
fictionalized “smart drug” that confers intelligence, instant learning, or recall. The argument 
here is that neuroenhancement is not considered cheating because it does not replace the 
intellectual work done in academic or professional environments (Forlini and Racine, 2012a). 
In fact, students appear more accepting of neuroenhancement than plagiarism, which is 
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universally considered an infringement of academic integrity (Palamenghi and Bonfiglioli, 
2019). There is regulation regarding the sale and consumption of prescription substances and 
illicit substances that are associated with neuroenhancement effects. However, Duke 
University (USA) is the only academic institution that has a policy about “academic doping” 
(Aikins et al., 2017). With incomplete information about how current neuroenhancement 
technologies affect cognition, it is difficult to enforce policies about neuroenhancement. 
 
Access is another facet of fairness relevant to neuroenhancement. Here, it is important to 
include both access to neuroenhancement technology and access to opportunity. There is 
evidence from prevalence studies that use of prescription stimulants varies according to 
university location, academic performance, fraternity membership, and history of drugs use. 
Wealth is also reported as a characteristic of early adopters of tDCS (Wexler, 2018). All of 
these factors can have socio-economic underpinnings, which would enable or restrict access 
to neuroenhancement technology (Bogle and Smith, 2009). Access to neuroenhancement 
based on affluence would be unfair because it causes or reinforces disadvantage. However, 
some have argued that this is not a compelling argument against human enhancement 
generally because so much inequality is already present and tolerated in the form of a 
“natural lottery” of capabilities and disabilities (Savulescu, 2006; Harris, 2007). Furthermore, 
neuroenhancement could actually be used to promote equality in society as “opportunity 
maintenance” which Ray (2016) describes as “a means of remedying underprivileged 
children's experiences of social inequalities that are borne from inadequate schools” (p. 29). 
There is significant empirical evidence of public support for the use of neuroenhancement to 
“enhance to the norm” (Cabrera et al., 2014), “normalize” or “restore” cognitive function 
(Sabini and Monterosso, 2005). Again, the desired opportunities or level of cognitive 
function the stakeholders in question seek is still a matter of debate.   
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c) Neuroenhancement raises concerns about authenticity 
 
Several different concerns about neuroenhancement can be brought under the umbrella of 
“authenticity”. One states that someone who technologically enhances her mental abilities 
(especially to a significant degree) will no longer be “the same person” as before. This 
concern is also sometimes formulated in terms of a supposed threat to the person’s “identity” 
(Elliott, 1999). Second, neuroenhancement, particularly of mood and emotions, risks making 
people feel better at the cost of disconnecting them from the true nature of their alienating 
circumstances, acting as Marx’s proverbial “opium of the people” (Elliott, 1998). A third 
concern coincides with the worries about fairness described above, suggesting that 
neuroenhanced outcomes are somehow “fake” and tantamount to “cheating” (Schermer, 
2008). Part of the broader definition of neuroenhancement, use of caffeine and personal tutors 
are typically exempt from this concern.  
 
As David DeGrazia has pointed out, concerns about the impact of neuroenhancement on 
“identity” are often ambiguous between two different senses of the term: numerical identity, 
which concerns the grounds of our persistence through time as discrete individuals, and 
“narrative” identity, which refers to the set of attributes that make us the particular 
individuals we are (DeGrazia, 2005). While threats to numerical identity are undoubtedly a 
serious matter (being equivalent to the destruction of an individual!), neuroenhancement-
induced alterations of narrative identity are both more likely and less obviously problematic.  
 
The philosophical debate on neuroenhancement and identity is ongoing. Though 
neuroenhancements are typically intended to produce positive effects, one might contend that 
improving some aspect of mental functioning can have a negative impact overall on narrative 
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identity. For example, increasing happiness by boosting the disposition to positive affect and 
reducing that to negative affect might render someone less empathetic towards others. Or, it 
might make her less attuned to the dark reality of her condition (a line of argument that would 
bring together the first two authenticity-related concerns). Alternatively, the issue might 
concern the transformative intervention itself rather than its outcome: it might be said to 
manifest problematic attitudes, such as self-objectification. 
 
In response, we may note that while such concerns do seem applicable in some cases of 
neuroenhancement, it is debatable whether they apply to all neuroenhancement use – even 
when it affects narrative identity. After all, insofar as the capacity for empathy, or the ability 
to realistically assess one’s own circumstances, ultimately depend (like all mental capacities) 
on the way our brain functions, we may conclude that they, too, could in principle be 
improved via neuroenhancement. In that case, the intervention would actually be enhancing 
rather than compromising authenticity as authors like Elliott understand it (Levy, 2011). And 
this seems true even in cases where no pathological state is involved. Insofar as “normal” 
mental functioning does not mean always having perfectly rational or “fitting” emotional 
responses, it is still compatible with both excesses and deficits in traits like empathy or 
pessimism (Kahane, 2011). We may also question whether all cases of neuroenhancement 
must exhibit problematic attitudes. For instance, it is not clear that using biomedical means to 
reduce racial bias, or improve one’s memory (in someone at the lower end of “normal” 
memory), would make one open to the charge of self-objectification. 
 
Similar remarks apply to the idea that neuroenhancement can only yield “fake” 
improvements or achievements. In some cases, the charge will have bite. These include cases 
where an intervention is unduly perceived as having enhancing effects. They can also include 
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effective interventions, in cases where these do not produce the relevant outcome in the 
“right” manner. The fictional, BCI-assisted winner of the World Memory Championships 
described above could be rightly accused of cheating – not just for breaking the rules of the 
contest, but also for failing to demonstrate the kind of excellences (successful mastery of 
challenging mnemonic techniques, etc.) that the contest was meant to test. Unlike someone 
who solicited the services of a ghost writer, a (healthy) student who produced a quality essay 
while relying on stimulation medication to focus better would not seem guilty of an 
inauthentic accomplishment, as long as she did not claim to have written the essay without 
any such help (Kadlac, 2017). 
 
d) To neuroenhance or not to neuroenhance? 
 
The potential for neuroenhancement to enable self-fulfilment or self-creation presents an 
attractive opportunity but also a pivotal decision. There is significant disagreement about 
whether individuals ought to have the choice to use neuroenhancement and whether that 
choice could ever be autonomous. The concept of “cognitive liberty” reflects “every person‘s 
fundamental right to think independently, to use the full spectrum of his or her mind, and to 
have autonomy over his or her brain chemistry” (Sententia, 2004, p. 223). It condones the 
availability and use of neuroenhancement technologies to support every individual’s self-
fulfilment. Indeed, some argue that neuroenhancement allows individuals to exercise their 
autonomy to its fullest potential by improving reasoning abilities (Schaefer et al., 2014). 
However, some consider that the choice to enhance ought not to exist. This reasoning is 
attributed to conservative stances that deem neuroenhancement as an affront to ‘human 
nature’, and the inalterable cognitive capabilities we are ‘gifted’ at birth (The President’s 
Council on Bioethics (U.S.), 2003; Sandel, 2007). While there is enthusiasm to study and 
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reap the benefits of neuroenhancement, it is unclear how the choice to use neuroenhancement 
technology would be presented to individuals. 
 
For the moment, neuroenhancement is largely regarded as a personal choice according to the 
lifestyle paradigm prevalent in media coverage of the phenomenon (Forlini and Racine, 
2009). Empirical studies also support this view emphasizing the importance of autonomy and 
personal values of individuals when choosing to use neuroenhancement (Goldschmidt and 
Renn, 2006). However, in reality this decision is complicated by the collision of belief in 
personal choice with peer or social pressures present in environments that could influence the 
behaviour of individuals (Schelle et al., 2014). University students have reported feeling at a 
disadvantage knowing that other students could be performing better with neuroenhancers. It 
is believed that this feeling creates implicit coercion that increases willingness among 
students to use neuroenhancement (Sattler et al., 2013). The extent to which such implicit 
coercion should be viewed as problematic is a matter of dispute (compare Vincent and Jane, 
2014, and Erler, 2020). Others have discussed whether explicit coercion by employers might 
be justified for professions that depend alertness and mental acuity to navigate high-risk 
situations such as medical professionals, pilots and military personnel (Schoomaker, 2007, 
Appel, 2008, Sugden et al., 2010). The question is whether their choice to enter a profession 
or the military justifies coercive measures to use neuroenhancement to maintain a high level 
of performance (see “Coercion”, by Joel Feinberg, in the REP).  
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